Diversification and Sophistication of Banking Services and Exclusive Venue Privilege on a Collision Course by Nifong, J. Michael
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 3
Spring 1980
Diversification and Sophistication of Banking
Services and Exclusive Venue Privilege on a
Collision Course
J. Michael Nifong
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. M. Nifong, Diversification and Sophistication of Banking Services and Exclusive Venue Privilege on a Collision Course, 8 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
209 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol8/iss2/3
DIVERSIFICATION AND SOPHISTICATION OF BANKING
SERVICES AND EXCLUSIVE VENUE PRIVILEGE ON A
COLLISION COURSE
J. MICHAEL NIFONG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The statute prescribing venue in actions against national bank-
ing associations, 12 U.S.C. § 94,1 requires that federal court actions
be brought where the bank is "established," but that state court
actions be brought where the bank is "located." Historically, the
resulting exclusive venue privilege had a two-fold rationale: (1) to
prevent interruption of national banking operations by the neces-
sity of producing witnesses and documents in distant forums;8 and
(2) to allay the fear that massive expansion of state banks would
strangle the national banking system." However, the advent of na-
tional branch banking has undermined both that rationale and the
exclusivity of the venue privilege.
By "establishing" branches in several "locations," national bank-
ing associations have left themselves open to the more liberal
venue provisions long endured by their corporate counterparts.5
More importantly, changing bank practices have caused confusion
in the application of section 94.
To compound the problem, it is settled law that while federal
law controls the definition of a "branch," state law determines the
* Partner in the Miami law firm of Blackwell, Walker, Gray, Powers, Flick & Hoehl.
J.D. 1974, University of Florida. Member of the Bars of the District of Columbia and
Florida.
1. (1976). The Statute is derived from the National Bank Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, §
30, 13 Stat. 108, and the Act of February 18, 1875, ch. 80, § 1, 18 Stat. 320.
2. Section 94 provides:
Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had in
any district or territorial court of the United States held within the district in
which such association may be established, or in any state, county or municipal
court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction
in similar cases.
12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976).
3. First Nat'l Bank v. Morgan, 132 U.S. 141, 145 (1889) (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Pah-
quioque Nat'l Bank, 81 U.S. 383, 394 (1871)).
4. H.R. Doc. No. 90, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1924). For well-founded criticism of the
mandatory interpretation given § 94 by the judiciary, see, e.g., Steinberg, Waiver of Venue
Under the National Bank Act: Preferential Treatment for National Banks, 62 IowA L.
REv. 129 (1976); Note, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National Banks, 34 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 765 (1966); Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits Against National Banks: A
Procedural Anachronism, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 179 (1973).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
6. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969); see 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) 1976).
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extent to which branches may be established and operated.' States'
banking laws vary greatly.8 Further, under certain circumstances,
the federal statute's exclusive venue privilege can be waived.9
The venue problems presented by the terms "established" and
"located" cause most litigants to seek to circumvent the statute's
provisions. In addition to the waiver exception, there are also vari-
ous procedural devices for doing so. Unfortunately, whether these
procedural exceptions apply in a particular case is usually an issue
for litigation.
Section 94 is not designed for today's sophisticated banking
transactions. It is obsolete. The distinction between "established"
and "located" is not rationally justifiable. The statute causes
senseless and expensive litigation. It should be revised, either by
radical and systematic judicial construction or by congressional
action.
II. THE ADVENT OF BRANCH BANKING
National banking associations were not permitted to engage in
any branch banking until 1927.10 Therefore, in effect, the words
"established" and "located" were originally synonymous." A bank
was "established" in the county named in its charter.12 That
county was the bank's "principal place of business.""3 Since branch
banking was not allowed, that county was also the bank's
"location."14
With passage of the McFadden Act," national banks were al-
lowed to operate branches in the "city, town or village in which
said association is situated," if branch banking was expressly au-
thorized for state banks under corresponding state law."' This se-
vere restriction on branch banking was slightly relaxed in 1933.7
7. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259 (1966).
8. See Hablutzel, State Regulation of Branch Banking, 16 DuQ. L. REv. 679 (1977-78).
9. See discussion infra.
10. McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 639-191, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927) (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1976)).
11. See Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 44 (1977).
12. Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 677
(1936).
13. Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883, 884 (3d Cir. 1972).
14. Id.
15. McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 639-191, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927) (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1976)).
16. Id.
17. Act of June 16, 1933, Pub. L. No. 66-89, § 23, 48 Stat. 189 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 36(c),(d) (1976)).
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Congress allowed national banks to operate branches anywhere in
the state in which the bank was chartered, but again subjected the
federal permission to implementation through express state statu-
tory authorization for state bank branching.18
The trend of extending banking operations continued. In 1935
banks were permitted to create seasonal agencies, in the same
county as the main office, to transact certain limited, statutorily
defined banking functions within resort communities.1
A 1952 amendment established more liberal guidelines for the
retention of branches by national banks when the branch resulted
from the conversion of a state bank or through other forms of cor-
porate consolidation.20 Under the original National Banking Act,
maintenance of such branches was restricted to a grandfather
clause.2 1 The minimal capitalization requirements for branches
were also abolished in 1952.2
The expansion of branch banking in recent years has been phe-
nomenal. As codified in the McFadden Act and as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court,2 3 state law is preeminent in de-
termining the extent to which branches may now be established
and operated. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
passed branch banking legislation. 4 The laws vary greatly.2 5
18. Id.
19. Act of Aug. 23, 1935, Pub. L. No. 305-614, § 305, 49 Stat. 708 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 36(c) (1976)).
20. Act of July 15, 1952, Pub. L. No. 543-753, § 2(b), 66 Stat. 633 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 36(b)(1), (2) (1976)). Branches in existence at the time of consolidation or conver-
sion may continue, upon the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, if they could be
established under existing state law.
21. McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 639-191, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927) (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 36(b) (1976)). State banks which were converted into or consolidated with a na-
tional banking association could retain and operate branches lawfully in existence on Febru-
ary 25, 1927.
22. Act of July 15, 1952, Pub. L. No. 543-753, § 2(b), 66 Stat. 633 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 36(c)(2) (1976)).
23. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966), wherein a unani-
mous Court reasserted the policy of "competitive equality" and held that the Comptroller of
the Currency is required to follow Utah law in deciding whether or not to allow branch
banks in Utah. This decision resolved a conflict in the circuits by affirming Walker Bank &
Trust Co. v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1965), and reversing First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon,
352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
24. Wyoming has no statute.
25. Arizona, Maine, Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District of Columbia
have authorized unrestricted, statewide or districtwide branch banking. All six of these ju-
risdictions do, however, require an evaluation by the appropriate state regulatory agency.
Alaska, California, Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, and South Caro-
lina permit statewide branches with limitations regarding capital and surplus requirements.
Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and
19801
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Even before these state laws were passed legalizing the establish-
ment of branch banks, de facto branch banking existed. Holding
companies and affiliates are two means which have been utilized by
major banking institutions to obviate restrictions on branches. The
former occurs where there are two corporations: the parent owning
controlling stock in the subsidiary, but each retaining its separate
charter. The latter envisions common stock ownership, officers and
directors, but legal restrictions are satisfied by retention of sepa-
rate charters.2 6
Despite the preeminence of state law on the subject of branch
banking, state action may not interfere with national banks except
as permitted by Congress. 7 Further, federal law determines what
is a "branch."2 8
The evolution of electronic fund transfer devices has stretched
the definition of a "branch."2 9 Generally referred to as customer-
bank communication terminals (CBCT's) and their derivatives, re-
mote service units (RSU's), point-of-sale terminals (POS's) and
automated teller units (ATU's), these technologically innovative
Wisconsin have enacted statutes generally permitting statewide branch banking, but limit-
ing expansion into cities or towns where other state or national banks maintain their princi-
pal office. There is a myriad of differences in the laws of these nine states.
Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Mississippi have adopted laws allowing branches
outside the home county or district, but containing diverse geographic and capitalization
requirements. Connecticut's law limits expansion into cities or towns where other banks
maintain their principal offices. Georgia, Mississippi, New York and Oregon permit state-
wide or countywide branch banking with restraints predicated upon population. Missis-
sippi's law also contains capitalization requirements. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin allow
countywide branch banking, although some in conjunction with other restrictions. New
Hampshire and Washington allow branches in the city or town where the principal bank is
located. Hablutzel, State Regulation of Branch Banking, 16 DuQ. L. REv. 679 (1977-78).
26. Id. at 682.
27. Van Reed v. People's Nat'l Bank, 198 U.S. 554 (1905).
28. First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969). The Court held that to permit
state law to define "branch" would allow the states to be "the sole judges of their own
powers." In conclusion, the Court ruled: "Although the definition may not be a model of
precision, in part due to its circular aspect, it defines the minimum content of the term
"branch"; by use of the word "include" the definition suggests a calculated indefiniteness
with respect to the outer limits of the term." Id. at 135.
12 U.S.C. § 36(f) provides:
The term "branch" . . . shall be held to include any branch bank, branch office,
branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business located in any
State or Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia at which
deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.
29. See generally, Wolfson & Stevens, You Can Bank On It: An Analysis of Judicial
Branch Bank Characterization'and an Alternate Proposal, 5 J. CoMPuTERs & LAW 389
(1976).
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mechanisms are designed to simplify and expand banking services.
From the outset, the Comptroller of the Currency and the judici-
ary took divergent positions on whether CBCT's should be in-
cluded in the definition of branch. The Comptroller, believing the
operation of CBCT's were in accord with sound banking and pub-
lic policies, found CBCT's not to be branches of national banks,
thereby leaving CBCT location decisions to the private rationality
of business decisionmaking5 0
Initially, several district courts accepted the Comptroller's inter-
pretative ruling, although one of these decisions was later re-
versed. 1 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, how-
ever, settled the issue that CBCT's are "branch banks."'1 The
decision 'caused removal of the Comptroller's ruling from the Code
of Federal Regulations.
At this time CBCT's effect on the scope of the definition of sec-
tion 94 is indeterminate, because CBCT's are not to be established
more than fifty miles from the bank's main office or closest
branch.8 Thus the overwhelming majority of CBCT's are in the
same county where the national bank is established or located. But
this too is subject to change. It is noteworthy that the National
Bank Act s was recently held to authorize a bank based in one
state to charge its out-of-state customers interest at the rate au-
thorized by its home state even though that rate violates the state
30. Department of the Treasury News, Comptroller of the Currency, Press Releases (De-
cember 12, 1974), excerpts below procured from 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491 (1975), removed 41 Fed.
Reg. 36,198 (1976):
(a) A national bank may make available . . . electronic devices or machines
through which the customer may communicate to the bank a request to withdraw
money either from his account or from a previously authorized line of credit, or an
instruction to receive or transfer funds for the customer's benefit. The device may
receive or dispense cash. . .subject to verification by the bank. Such devices may
be unmanned or manned by a bona fide third party under contract to the bank.
• ..Any transactions .. .shall be subject to verification by the bank.
(b) Use of such devices at locations other than the main office or a branch office
of the bank does not constitute branch banking.
31. Oklahoma ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. Bank of Oklahoma, 409 F. Supp. 71 (N.D.
Okla. 1975); Illinois ex rel. Lignoul v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 409 F.
Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 176 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871 (1976).
32. Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). Judge Wikey found strong support for the court's opinion in
Representative McFadden's analysis of 12 U.S.C. § 36 at the time of its adoption, 534 F.2d
at 539 (citing 68 CONG. REC. 5816 (1977)). See also, First Nat'l Bank v. Walker, 385 U.S. 252
(1966), First Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Heimann, 600 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1979).
33. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7491(c) (1975), removed 41 Fed. Reg. 36,198 (1976).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1976).
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usury laws of the bank's nonresident customer's state." This deci-
sion will certainly encourage further expansion of interstate and
intrastate banking services via branches and perhaps later through
CBCT's.
III. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF SECTION 94
Prior to 1963, it was unclear whether the phrase in section 94
"actions . . . may be had" was permissive or mandatory.86 Federal
courts generally construed the phrase to be mandatory. 7 State
courts were split on the issue.3 8 However, in Mercantile National
Bank v. Langdeau,39 the United States Supreme Court held that
the phrase was mandatory. In Mercantile, the plaintiff was the re-
ceiver of a Texas insurance company in liquidation in a Texas
state court in Travis County. Plaintiff was suing two national
banks, and 143 other parties, for conspiracy to defraud. The two
national banks were located in Dallas County, Texas. Neither had
branches. The banks objected to being sued in the Travis County
state court. They argued that under section 94 venue was exclusive
in Dallas County.40
The issue was appealed through to the Texas Supreme Court.
The court held that section 94 was permissive; that is, it did not
mandate exclusive venue in the court serving the county where the
bank was located.4 1 The Texas Supreme Court also held that since
under the Texas Insurance Code, venue was to be in the county
where the delinquency proceedings were pending, that the court in
Travis County had venue over the two national banks.4'
The United States Supreme Court reversed.4 National banks
were quasi-public institutions and national in character.4 The leg-
35. Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 99 S. Ct. 540 (1978). It must be
noted that few banks, with the exceptions being grandfather clause situations, have
branches in more than one state because 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c), 81 (1976) apparently prohibit
national banking associations from maintaining branches (except foreign or Edge Act
branches) in any state other than that of the bank's incorporation. See Marquette Nat'l
Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 99 S. Ct. at 546 n.20. Cf. International Refuge Org. v.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
36. Annot., 86 A.L.R. 47 (1933). For the text of § 94, see note 2 supra.
37. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 562 n.13 (1963).
38. For early cases holding that § 94 was permissive, see Annot., 86 A.L.R. 47 (1933).
39. 371 U.S. 555, 562 (1963).
40. Id.
41. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 331 S.W.2d 349, 353 (1960).
42. Id.
43. Mercantile, 371 U.S. at 567.
44. The Court stated:
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islative intent was to protect national banks from the inconve-
nience of being sued in distant forums.4' Permitting the Texas In-
surance Code to prevail over section 94 would contravent the
congressional intent.46 Section 94 was mandatory: venue was exclu-
sive to the state court sitting in the county where the bank was
located.47
The Court was not sympathetic to the argument that mandatory
construction would result in the plaintiff's having to bring two
suits in two locations for the same cause of action.4 8 First, as to the
plaintiff in Mercantile, the Court construed the Texas Insurance
Code as allowing changing venue for all defendants to the court in
Dallas County."e That the plaintiffs and all the other defendants
might be inconvenienced by the distant forum was a matter for
legislative action; the Court could not change the law.50
Mercantile's importance is highlighted by the rapid expansion of
branch banking and services that took place during its fifteen year
reign as the governing authority on section 94. Because the defen-
dant banks in Mercantile had no branches, the Court did not have
to address the issue of defining "location." Consequently, as
branch banking became more extensive, construction of section 94
became more difficult.
In suits against branches of national banks, some courts held
that venue was proper in the county where the branch was "lo-
cated." 5  Other courts held that "located" and "established" were
synonymous, and that therefore, venue was exclusive in the county
The roots of this problem reach back to the National Banking Act of 1863 (12
Stat. 65), replaced a year later by the Act of 1865, 13 Stat. 99. National Banks are
federal instrumentalities and the power of Congress over them is extensive. "Na-
tional banks are quasi-public institutions, and for the purpose for which they are
instituted are national in their character, and, within constitutional limits, are
subject to the control of Congress and are not to be interfered with by state legis-
lative or judicial action, except so far as the lawmaking power of the Government
may permit."
Id. at 558-59 (quoting Van Reed v. People's Nat'l Bank, 198 U.S. 554 (1905)).
45. 371 U.S. at 561 n.12.
46. Id. at 560.
47. Id. at 561.
48. Id. at 563.
49. Id. at 564. The Court began "though we have no intention of venturing an opinion on
matters of Texas procedure..." then continued to take judicial notice of the Texas proce-
dural rules, and the recent Texas cases that construed them, and concluded that venue
could be changed to Dallas County. Id.
50. Id. at 563.
51. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 40 (1977).
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named in the bank's charter."' Still other courts held that by open-
ing a branch in a county different from the one where the national
bank was chartered, the bank had waived its personal privilege of
exclusive venue." The waiver theory was also argued to circumvent
the exclusive venue privilege in federal courts. Unfortunately, most
courts found the national banks' activities insufficient by them-
selves to constitute a waiver." Like the Court in Mercantile, most
courts held that changing section 94 to comport with modern times
was a matter for congressional action.5 5
Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Bougas,"6 decided in
1977, was the first step toward alleviating the harsh result of Mer-
cantile. In Citizens & Southern, the United States Supreme Court
held that a state court suit could be brought against a branch bank
at the "location" of the branch.7 Citizens and Southern National
Bank was chartered in Chatham County, Georgia.58 It maintained
a branch in DeKalb County, Georgia. Bougas alleged that the
DeKalb County branch had converted a $25,000 savings certificate
which had been deposited as collateral for a note that Bougas had
signed as surety."' Suit was brought in DeKalb County. The bank
moved to dismiss on the ground that under section 94 venue was
exclusive in Chatham County. The motion was denied.80 On inter-
locutory appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. 61 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the con-
flict among state courts as to the definition of a branch's "location"
under section 94.62
Mercantile was the starting point of the Court's analysis. The
Court did not retreat from the position that section 94 was to be
mandatorily construed. Rather, since Mercantile did not concern
branch banking, the Court focused on the narrowly drawn issue of
52. Id.
53. Id. at 40, 41.
54. See, e.g., Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798 (5th
Cir. 1973); Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
944 (1952).
55. See, e.g., United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970); Buffum v.
Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952).
56. 434 U.S. 35 (1977).
57. Id. at 44.
58. Id. at 36-37.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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defining "located." 6 First, the Court considered whether the terms
"established" and "located" were synonymous. Certainly, before
the advent of branch banking, they were. Equally certain, Congress
could not have foreseen the advent of branch banking when it
chose to use the two different words." However, the Congressional
intent was to spare a national bank the inconvenience of defending
suit in a distant forum. That intent could best be met by allowing
venue in the place where the branch is "located." a The Court also
pointed out that improvements in data processing and transporta-
tion have largely dispelled the inconvenience concern."
Citizens & Southern only solved part of the problem caused by
section 94. The issue of defining "established" for purposes of fed-
eral court litigation, the issue of what activities constitute waiver
of the exclusive venue privilege, and the issue of defining "located"
for purposes of state court litigation against parent national banks
are still unresolved.
The Court had the opportunity to consider both the "estab-
lished" and the waiver issues in Citizens & Southern. It declined
to do so."
As to the "established" issue, the Court noted that federal courts
uniformly construe "established" to mean the place named in the
bank's charter."" The Court next stated that it was uncertain as to
the correctness of that definition, but would refrain from address-
ing the issue in this case.' In his concurring opinion, Justice Stew-
art emphasized that the Court was withholding approval of that
definition.°
The Court should have offered an alternative definition. As it
63. Id. at 39.
64. Id. at 39-43.
65. Id. at 44 & n.10. The Court stated:
This interpretation of § 94 will not inconvenience the bank or unfairly burden it
with distant litigation in violation of any congressional policy. We recognize that
Congress adopts venue provisions in part for the convenience of the parties ...
Litigation of this dispute in DeKalb County inconveniences no one to any real
degree. Respondent chose to file his suit there. Petitioner has established a perma-
nent business there, taking advantage of the commerce of the community. Its at-
torneys have their offices in adjoining Fulton County, part of the Atlanta metro-
politan area. Litigation in DeKalb County cannot be more inconvenient than
litigation in Chatham County, the place of chartering, some 200 miles away.
Id. at 44 n.10 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 44.
67. Id. at 39, 44 n.9 ("established"); 38 (waiver).
68. Id. at 39.
69. Id. at 39, 44 n.9. See also Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, id. at 45.
70. Id. at 45.
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stands now, the questionable definition which places emphasis on
the charter is all the federal courts have. The result, reading Citi-
zens & Southern together with Mercantile, is that while branches
of national banks may be "located" at their geographical sites, they
are still "established" in the county named in the charter. Thus, in
federal litigation, venue against a branch is still exclusive in the
county where the parent bank is located. Finding the terms "estab-
lished" and "located" synonymous under the new definition of "lo-
cated" would have provided a better solution.
Even in state court suits, Citizens & Southern has been nar-
rowly read. In Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Ser-
vice Corp.,7 the Court held that operation of an extensive Bank
Americard program was not sufficient to "locate" the bank for
venue purposes.7 2 A national bank can only be "located" at the
place named in its charter, or in the place where it maintains a
branch. 3
Similarly, the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama restricted Citi-
zens & Southern to the letter when it held that venue was im-
proper in the place where the bank's principal shareholder resided
and had its principal place of business.7 4 Massachusetts 7 5 Califor-
nia 76 and Florida71 have also restricted Citizens & Southern to
cases involving branch banking.
In a novel approach, the South Carolina Supreme Court allowed
venue in a state action against Mellon Bank, which is chartered in
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.7 8 The court noted that Mellon
Bank had "received and loaned money" in Sumter County, South
Carolina.7 9 Therefore, it fit within the definition of a "branch"
under 12 U.S.C. § 36(f).80 The court reasoned that a bank is "lo-
cated" wherever it has a branch and, thus, venue was proper.81
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court read Citizens &
71. 99 S. Ct. 540 (1978).
72. Id. at 548.
73. Id. at 546 n.21.
74. Central Bank v. Boyles, 355 So. 2d 98, 100 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
75. Design Decor, Inc. v. Barczak, 374 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. App. 1978).
76. Kaiser Aetna v. I.C. Deal, Inc., 150 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App. 1978).
77. First Pa. Bank v. Oreck, 357 So. 2d 743 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 368
So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1979).
78. Southland Mobile Homes v. Associates Fin'l Servs. Co., 244 S.E.2d 212 (S.C. 1978).
79. Id. at 214. It is particularly interesting that Mellon Bank had "loaned" the money
through its co-defendant, Associates Financial Services Company, Inc. Id.
80. Id. For the text of § 36(f), see note 28 supra.
81. 244 S.E.2d at 213 (citing Citizens & Southern, 434 U.S. 35 (1977) and Holson v.
Gosnell, 216 S.E.2d 539 (S.C. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1048 (1976)).
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Southern too broadly. In Citizens & Southern, the Court did not
resolve whether maintenance of a branch waived the exclusive
venue privilege. Consequently, it is uncertain whether state court
action can be brought against the parent bank in the county where
it maintains a branch. Reading Citizens & Southern together with
Mercantile and Marquette, the answer seems to be "no." More im-
portantly, in an action against both the branch and the parent
bank, where each is located in a different county, it is uncertain
whether two suits must be filed, one in each county, or whether
venue lies against both in either county. Additionally, by refusing
to hold that maintenance of a branch is ipso facto a waiver of the
exclusive venue privilege, the Court perpetuated the venue prob-
lem in federal litigation. Pre-Citizens & Southern cases concerning
waiver remain good precedent. As noted earlier, most of those
cases found the national banks' activities insufficient to constitute
a waiver. The Third, 2 Fifth,83 Seventh, 4 and Ninth" Circuits held
that the exclusive venue privilege may be waived only by inference
from conduct inconsistent with the assertion of the privilege, or by
declaration or conduct indicating a voluntary and intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment. Although these courts recognized that
technological advancements reduce potential hardship, they con-
cluded that amendment of section 94 was a matter of congressional
concern.
Briefly, only a few pre-Citizens & Southern activities have been
held to constitute a waiver of the exclusive venue privilege: (1)
filing and submitting to over one hundred suits in another venue
without objection;86 (2) refinancing, purchasing, and storing air-
82. Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972) (maintenance of
branch; advertising; involvement in locale's fiscal affairs; and use of locale's courts insuffi-
cient to constitute a waiver).
83. Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson Inc., 480 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1973)
(neither maintenance of a branch nor commission of an intentional tort constitute a waiver).
84. Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944
(1952) (authorization to do business in another state for limited purpose of acceptance and
execution of trusts and receipt of deposits of trust, and employment of a registered agent to
accept service in relation to trust does not waive the exclusive venue privilege).
85. United States Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 434 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1970) (although waiver was
not discussed, the court relied on several waiver cases to hold that the definition of "estab-
lish" could not be expanded to allow venue at the location of a branch).
86. Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1973) (suit for wrongful
possession brought in the Southern District of California against a branch; bank's principal
place of business was Northern District of California; bank had 66 branches in Southern
District; waiver, however, was predicated on fact that bank had been sued 338 times and
had initiated suit 105 times in the Southern District without raising venue objections).
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planes giving rise to a security interest;17 (3) maintenance of a "full
service bank" in another state;88 (4) branch maintenance of all
records relating to the branch, combined with computerized record
systems; 9 and (5) joint liability as a trustee.9
In contrast, the following activities have been held insufficient to
constitute a waiver of the exclusive venue privilege: maintenance of
a branch;91 ownership of real property;92 the commission of an in-
tentional tort;93 operation of credit card plans;94 performance as an
indenture trustee;9 appointment of a receiver to manage apart-
ment houses upon which the bank held a first mortgage;" contrac-
87. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1972) (although
a state case, it was relied on in Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal.
1973)). In Michigan, the bank had no branches in California. The court used a minimum
contacts jurisdictional approach. The court analogized the self-help activities relating to the
repossession of airplanes to the use of state courts. 99 Cal. Rptr. at 830. Since a countersuit
for matters arising out of court-processed repossession would have waived § 94, then so also
did self-help where that was the subject of the complaint. Id. In Reaves, the court held that
in-court proceedings relating to repossession of automobiles was an even stronger reason for
finding waiver. 352 F. Supp. at 749.
88. Frankford Supply Co. v. Matteo, 305 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (a bank "estab-
lished" in New Jersey waived its right to be sued only in that state on a garnishment action
when it maintained a full-service bank in Pennsylvania; the branch was permitted by a
grandfather clause in the banking code). Cf. Robbins, Coe, Rubinstein & Shafran, Ltd. v. Re
Tek, Inc., 320 N.E.2d 157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (garnishment proceedings are not actions
against a bank and, therefore, § 94 does not apply).
89. Lapinsohn v. Lewis Charles, Inc., 240 A.2d 90 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952
(1968) (another state case, but relied on in Frankford Supply Co. v. Matteo, 305 F. Supp.
794 (E.D. Pa. 1969)).
90. County of Okeechobee v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 150 So. 124 (Fla. 1933) (a vintage state
case; action was predicated on a tri-party trust agreement; the trustees were the national
bank, a state bank, having its principal place of business in Okeechobee County, and the
Okeechobee County Commissioners; finding a waiver avoided preventing joinder of the na-
tional bank as an indispensable party.
91. See, e.g., Bruns, Nordeman & Co. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 855 (1968); Helco, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 470
F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972); Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 677 (1936); Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798 (5th
Cir. 1973). See also First Nat'l Bank v. United States District Court, 468 F.2d 180 (9th Cir.
1972) (employment contract dispute between bank and branch employees; maintenance of
branch does not constitute waiver; § 94 is not restricted to suits arising from banking func-
tions and relations with bank customers).
92. Bechtel v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 534 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976) (the bank took a deed in
lieu of foreclosure).
93. Northside Iron & Metal Co. v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 480 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1973).
94. Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 338 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Iowa 1972), appeal dismissed, 466
F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1972). See also Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 99 S.
Ct. 540 (1978).
95. Rome v. Eltra Corp., 297 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
96. Central Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1973).
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tually providing to be governed by the laws of another state;9  and
being authorized to do business in another state, issuing letters of
credit pursuant to that authorization, and litigating over those let-
ters of credit in the other state. 8
Post-Citizens & Southern federal cases have reached conflicting
results.
In Dawson v. First National Bank," plaintiffs were partners in a
retail business which had been refused rental of store space in an
Arizona shopping center. They filed an antitrust action in Arizona
naming the First National Bank of Chicago as one of the defen-
dants.100 It was undisputed that the bank was "established" in
Chicago, Illinois. The issue was whether by its actions in Arizona,
the bank had waived its privilege of exclusive venue in the district
court serving Chicago. 10 1
The bank (1) was authorized to do business in Arizona; (2) had
named a statutory agent within Arizona to receive service of pro-
cess; (3) as trustee, owned and managed the shopping center; (4) as
trustee, refused to rent store space to the plaintiffs; (5) as trustee,
had purchased three additional parcels of improved Arizona real
estate; and (6) as trustee, had brought suit in Arizona courts. 02
Of all those activities, only the second, naming a statutory agent
for service of process, was held sufficient to constitute a waiver.
The other activities had been held insufficient in prior cases. 108
The court stated that "[t]he appointment of a statutory agent for
service of process is an unequivocal action consistent only with an
intent to consent to be sued in Arizona."' 04 In fact, the appoint-
ment of an agent had been a condition to being qualified to do
business in the state as trustee. 108 The trust was administered in
Chicago. 0 6
Although Citizens & Southern was specifically inapplicable be-
cause no branch banking was involved, the court was generally in-
97. Hills v. Burnett, 125 N.W.2d 66 (Neb. 1963).
98. Douglass v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 303 A.2d 359 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
99. 453 F. Supp 88, 88 (D. Ariz. 1978).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 89.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 90-91.
104. Id. at 91.
105. Id. at 89. But see Buffum v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 192 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952), which prior to Citizens & Southern had found these same
activities insufficient to constitute a waiver.
106. 453 F. Supp. at 89.
19801
222 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:209
fluenced by that case. The Dawson court interpreted Justice Stew-
art's concurring opinion as liberalizing the exclusive venue
privilege of national banks by its questioning of the restricted defi-
nition of "established. 1
Citizens & Southern was specifically applicable to the branch
banking situation in Allen v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.1 The
court stated that "once a statutory term has been given a judicial
construction that it would continue to be subject to judicial con-
struction when the policy on which the statute is based
changes."10 9 The court further characterized the exclusive venue
privilege as "outmoded and antiquated. '"110 Nevertheless, the court
did not accept the Citizens & Southern invitation to change the
definition of "established." Instead, the court held that the main-
tenance of the branch was an implied waiver of the exclusive venue
privilege.1 '
An interesting fact pattern is presented by Stinnett v. Third
National Bank,"' which involved a defamation suit brought in
Minnesota against a bank chartered in Massachusetts. The bank
had earlier brought suit in Minnesota against the plaintiffs on a
promissory note issue, which was later settled. Certain purportedly
defamatory news articles were annexed to the bank's complaint on
the note."' Although the court asserted that initiation of a suit in
a foreign jurisdiction should not be construed as a general waiver
by a national bank, the court held that waiver is present where a
party to the prior litigation brings suit against a national bank,
which suit "concerns causes of action that arise directly from the
bank's suit.' 14 Inconvenience was a factor in the decision, but the
bank's actions in initiating litigation were deemed to be an as-
107. Id. at 90. The Dawson court also cited the concurrence of Justice Rehnquist in
National Bank of North America v. Association of Obstetrics, 425 U.S. 460 (1976), a case in
which the Supreme Court held the provisions of § 94 to be mandatory but remanded to the
state supreme court for a determination of the waiver issue. Dawson, 453 F. Supp. at 94.
Justice Rehnquist believes § 94 to be equivalent to the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(c), and thus that the exclusive venue privilege is waived upon the designation of a
registered agent. 453 F. Supp. at 95.
108. 470 F. Supp. 18 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
109. Id. at 23.
110. Id.
111. Id. The court found that the combination of maintenance of a branch and the activ-
ities of transacting trusts, advertising, and prior utilization of Eastern District courts was
sufficient to constitute a waiver. Id.
112. 443 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Minn. 1978).
113. Id. at 1016.
114. Id. at 1017.
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sumption of the risk. 18
Courts in two recent Florida cases have declined to find a waiver
of the venue privilege where the national bank pursued quasi-
banking functions in the state. Although the Fourth District Court
of Appeal believed that section 94 had "outlived its usefulness," it
felt bound to adhere to its provisions because the defendant main-
tained no branches in the county where suit was pending."' Mere
ownership of land in the county was not deemed to be suffficient to
establish a waiver.1 17
The Florida Supreme Court, in concurring with the "decided
weight of authority," ruled that repossession of an automobile in
the county was not sufficient to establish waiver of the venue privi-
lege.118 While acknowledging the doctrine's existence," 9 the court
did not cite Citizens & Southern, apparently because the defend-
ant bank had only one principal place of business.
A California appellate court decision defined waiver in restrictive
terms and issued a writ of mandamus transferring the action to the
county where the bank's relevant records were located, per conces-
sion of bank counsel, and not to the county where the bank main-
tained its principal place of business. 20
Negotiating, issuing, and mailing a letter of credit and an indem-
nity agreement does not obviate the venue restraints of section 94,
held the United States District Court.1 21 Mercantile was cited, and
its mandatory construction quoted as a primary authority for the
ruling.""2
Filing a claim in related New York bankruptcy proceedings does
not submit a Boston bank to the venue of its New York debtor-
bankrupt, due to the prescriptions of section 94, and section 2a(7)
115. Id. "A national bank waives its venue privilege with respect to counterclaims raised
in suits it brings in foreign jurisdictions." Id. at 1017 n.2 (citations omitted); accord, First
Nat'l Bank v. White, 420 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Minn. 1976). See also Michigan Nat'l Bank v.
Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1972) (self-help equated to counterclaim
situation).
116. First Pa. Bank v. Oreck, 357 So. 2d 743, 745 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied,
368 So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1979).
117. Id.
118. Landmark Bank v. Giroux, 358 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1978) (citing Brown v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Nevada Nat'l Bank v.
Superior Court, 119 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Ct. App. 1975)).
119. 358 So. 2d at 181.
120. Central Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Ct. App. 1978).
121. Stutsman v. Patterson, 457 F. Supp. 189, 191 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
122. Id. at 192.
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of the Bankruptcy Act.1 23 Additionally, the financing activities of
the bank in New York were not considered to constitute a waiver
of section 94.124
IV. OTHER ExCEPTIONS TO SECTION 94
In addition to the exceptions to section 94 afforded by the
waiver doctrine and by Citizens & Southern, there are also proce-
dural devices available for avoiding the exclusive venue restric-
tions. The statute may not apply if the pending action has certain
characteristics: (1) it is not an "action against" a national bank; (2)
it is in rem or local in nature, rather than transitory; or (3) it is
involved with counterclaims or third party actions.
Unless the litigation seeks to place liabilities against the bank,
section 94 does not apply to prevent the chosen forum from exer-
cising jurisdiction. 125 In Robbins, Coe, Rubenstein, & Shafran, Ltd.
v. Ro Tek., Inc.,1 26 the Illinois Court of Appeals held that serving a
national banking association with a writ of garnishment is not an
action against the bank, and thus section 94 was not applicable.
In a well-reasoned opinion, the Robbins court emphasized that
garnishment proceedings are not actions "against" the bank as re-
quired by section 94.117 Few courts have seized upon that explicit
language in the statute; probably because the statutory categories
are akin to the distinctions between in rem proceedings and the
transitory actions. There are few reported decisions dealing with
this point.128 Since the bank's assets are not at issue, a defendant
bank would not be expected to contest the matter vigorously.
Although containing no determinative statement, Robbins also
indicates that garnishment actions are local in nature and hence, in
citing Casey v. Adams,12 9 the court finds another justification for
123. 11 U.S.C. § lla(7) (1976). Gluck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. (In re East-
ern Freight Ways, Inc.), 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
124. 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 582.
125. See Robbins, Coe, Rubinstein & Shafran, Ltd. v. Ro Tek., Inc., 320 N.E.2d 157 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1974).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 161. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976), begins "Actions and proceedings against any [na-
tional banks] .... " (emphasis added).
128. See, e.g., Frankford Supply Co. v. Matteo, 305 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1969), where
there was also a garnishment proceeding, but the court relied on waiver theory to avoid § 94.
129. 102 U.S. 66 (1880). Casey holds:
Local actions are in the nature of suits in rem, and are to be prosecuted where the
thing on which they are founded is situated. To give the act of Congress the con-
struction now contended for would be in effect to declare that a national bank
could not be sued at all in a local action where the thing about which the suit was
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obviating the effect of section 94.130 Salient in Robbins is the belief
that garnishment actions are remedial in nature and thus ancillary
proceedings, independent of the main action. Since section 94's in-
tent was to provide for the convenience of the institutions, local
garnishment proceedings which do not interfere in a direct manner
with banking operations nor result in disruption of their services
do not come within the purview of section 94.131
The Lousiana Supreme Court has held, however, that a determi-
nation of the right of possession is transitory and is therefore an
action against the bank.8 2 Two Louisiana banks brought separate
suits in the different parishes where they were located against the
same debtor. First to procure a judgment was Security First Na-
tional Bank which obtained its judgment in Rapides Parish. In at-
tempting to satisfy the judgment, the bank had subpoenas issued
and an order to show cause directed to the second creditur bank,
National American, located in New Orleans Parish. National
American held certificates for certain race horses owned by the
mutual debtor, which Security First wanted to present at the pub-
lic sale of the horses. Hardpressed, National American raised sec-
tion 94 in defense to the subpoenas and the order to show cause;
this defense was rejected by the lower courts.13
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the action was transi-
tory and also ruled that the order to show cause was an action or
proceeding against the second bank, and therefore had to be
brought where National American was located.13 4
The first judicial pronouncement that local actions were exempt
from the exclusive venue prescriptions is found in Casey v. Ad-
ams,13 5 a case involving the predecessor to section 94, which is
often discussed by courts interpreting section 94.186 Local and
transitory are defined by state law. 137 Generally speaking, a local,
brought was not in the judicial district of the United States within which the bank
was located. Such a result could never have been contemplated by Congress.
Id. at 68 (emphasis in original).
130. Robbins, 320 N.E.2d at 161.
131. Id.
132. Security First Nat'l Bank v. Tattersall, 311 So. 2d 218 (La. 1975).
133. Id. at 220-21.
134. Id. at 222-23.
135. 102 U.S. 66 (1880).
136. See, e.g., Leonardi v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 81 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
677 (1936).
137. Security First Nat'l Bank v. Tattersall, 311 So. 2d 218 (La. 1975); Moreland v.
Rucker Pharmacal Co., 59 F.R.D. 537 (D.C. La. 1973); McAdoo v. Union Nat'l Bank, 558
F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1977).
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as distinguished from a transitory action, is an action seeking to
determine interests or rights in property which may be pursued
only at the property's location. '
In Helco Inc. v. First National City Bank,'39 the Third Circuit
implied strongly that if an action is local in nature, the provisions
of section 94 are not applicable. In accord is Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Graves,"10 another garnishment action, in which the
court voiced its belief that section 94 is anachronistic. An Illinois
court's opinion of section 94's effect on local actions is found in
dicta in Tcherepnin v. Franz."' The court held that a fraudulent
conveyance suit, brought by the receiver of a savings and loan as-
sociation, is a transitory action.142
Any useful distinction between a local and a transitory action
depends solely on the character of the remedy sought. "4 Transi-
tory actions are defined as those in which the movant seeks a per-
sonal judgment against the defendant; "and, so far as jurisidction
is concerned, [they] may be brought before any competent court
having subject matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant.""' Local actions are those in which recourse is
directed against the property.
Procedural devices have in limited instances provided means to
avoid the exclusive venue provisions. Apparently, rule 14(a), Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, provides such i means."45 In Odette
138. Atlantic Quality Constr. Corp. v. First Pa. Bank, 440 F. Supp. 213, 217 (D.P.R.
1976); Tanglewood Mall, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 371 F. Supp. 722, 726 (W.D. Va.),
aff'd, 508 F.2d 838 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
139. 470 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1972). See also Chateau Lafayette Apts., Inc. v. Meadow
Brook Nat'l Bank, 416 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1969); Atlantic Quality Constr. Corp. v. First Pa.
Bank, 440 F. Supp. 213 (D.P.R. 1976); Reaves v. Bank of America, 352 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.
Cal. 1973); Frankford Supply Co. v. Matteo, 305 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Lapinsohn v.
Lewis Charles, Inc., 240 A.2d 90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968).
140. 381 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. La. 1974).
141. 439 F. Supp. 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
142. Id. at 1345.
143. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 1 0.142[2.-11, at 1362-63 (2d ed. 1979).
144. Id. .142[2-11], at 1362-63 (emphasis in original).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides:
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after commence-
ment of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a sum-
mons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or
may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him. The third-
party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he files the third-party
complaint not later than 10 days after he serves his original answer. Otherwise he
must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to the action. The person
served with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-
party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiff's claim as
19801 EXCLUSIVE VENUE PRIVILEGE
v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., "" one of the defendant brokerage
houses impleaded the National Bank of North America seeking
contribution and indemnity for the bank's alleged responsibility
for any misrepresentation made to the plaintiff's customer. As
might be expected, the bank sought a section 94 dismissal claiming
that the action was brought in the Southern District of New York
and that although the bank conducted the majority of its business
in the Southern District, its principal place of business was in the
Eastern District of New York.14 7 In a well-written opinion, District
Judge Carter based his decision to deny the motion on a long line
of cases and authorities holding that a third-party defendant has
no basis to object to improper venue."1 8
No cases relating specifically to section 94 were cited as author-
ity in Odette. However, numerous decisions holding that venue re-
quirements are to follow those of the primary action, predicated
upon the expediency and simplification purposes behind rule 14(a)
and the Federal Rules in general, formed the basis of the
opinion. 19
provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and
cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The
third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the
third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant may
also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plain-
tiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant there-
upon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. Any party may move to strike the third-party
claim, or for its severance or separate trial. A third-party defendant may proceed
under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-party
defendant ...
146. 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
147. Id. at 950. At the time of suit, 76% of National Bank of North America's major
divisions were located in the Southern District. It also had 27 full service branches located
in the Southern District.
148. Id. at 951. In conclusion, in Odette, the court stated:
Since NBNA is a third-party defendant pursuant to Rule 14(a), I hold that it may
not object to venue in the Southern District of New York. The purpose of Rule
14(a), to avoid multiplicity of actions, will be served by requiring NBNA to con-
test Shearson's claims in this proceeding rather than in a separate suit a few miles
away in the Eastern District.
Id. at 952.
149. Id. at 951-52 (citing Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583, 585 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 957 (1965); McGonigle v. Penn-Central Transp. Co., 49
F.R.D. 58, 60 (D. Md. 1969); Thompson v. United States Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 43
F.R.D. 197, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Morrell v. United Airlines Transp. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757,
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Evidently, Judge Carter did not find Swiss Israel Trade Bank v.
Mobley, 150 which failed to cite any previous authority whatsoever,
to be persuasive. In Swiss Israel, a third-party complaint was dis-
missed for improper venue. Swiss Israel held section 94 to be ger-
mane in a third-party proceeding. 15 1 It should be noted that one
authority cites Swiss Israel for the supposition that rule 14 is su-
perseded by section 94.152
The federal counterclaim rule is another procedural tool which
may be utilized to avoid section 94.1's In First National Bank v.
White,1 54 the bank sued on a promissory note in the district where
it was "established." The defendants counterclaimed alleging mis-
management of collateral and they impleaded a third-party corpo-
ration which had managed the collateral under an agreement with
the plaintiff bank. 5
Certain of the defendants also sought to change venue to the
759 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)).
150. 319 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
151. Id. at 375.
152. Comment, Restricted Venue in Suits Against National Banks: A Procedural
Anachronism, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv., 179, 184 (1973).
153. FED. R. Civ. P. 13 provides:
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any oppos-
ing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the pres-
ence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the
pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the
claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought
suit upon his claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not
acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader
is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13.
(g) Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein
or relating to any property that is the subject matter of the original action. Such
cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or
may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant.
(h) Joinder of Additional Parties. Persons other than those made parties to
the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim in accor-
dance with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20. ...
A bank joined as a defendant with a party over whom venue is proper is of no assistance.
Joinder of a national bank with a defendant over whom venue is proper will not suffice to
avoid the bank's exclusive venue privilege. See, e.g., Central Bank v. Boyles, 355 So. 2d 98
(Ala. Ct. App. 1977).
154. 420 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Minn. 1976).
155. Id. at 1334.
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District of Utah, which motion was granted. The bank objected to
the transfer, citing section 94.116 According to the Minnesota court,
this was a case of first impression, and it therefore relied on other
federal rules cases involving third-party matters, particularly
Odette.157 The court also criticized the holding in Swiss Israel.'as
The Minnesota court equated the. compulsory counterclaim, which
invokes ancillary subject matter jurisdiction, with a third-party
action and held that a counterdefendant by selecting the original
forum is thereby estopped from raising an improper venue objec-
tion. 169
The bank's reliance on the special venue statute was also found
to be particularly inappropriate. The court reasoned that the stat-
ute was enacted for the convenience of banks in a different era,
before the development of photocopying and computerized record
keeping. 60 There is indeed a fine line between the ancillary juris-
diction issue and the associated estoppel argument which were re-
lied upon in White and the more traditional notion that a bank in
choosing the forum waives its right in a federal court suit to object
to venue. 161 The same waiver rationale applies to counterclaims
raised in a state court action.16
Despite the fact that section 94 has been the subject of criti-
cism, s6 the United States Supreme Court has held that its specific
language has precedence over general jurisdictional provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co.'" the Court upheld a Second Circuit decision involving
156. Id. at 1337.
157. Id. at 1338.
158. The court stated:
In two cases the courts have dismissed the third party claims because the main
claim was not venued in the bank's home district. Southeast Guaranty Trust Co.,
Ltd. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Swiss Israel,
supra. In neither of these cases did the court offer any reasoning: each simply
concluded that the bank was involved in a proceeding "against" it and could in-
voke the statute.
420 F. Supp. at 1338 (emphasis added).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Abramson, 45 F.R.D. 97, 105-06 (D. Minn. 1968)
(citing General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metal Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932) wherein it was
held that a plaintiff waives venue privileges with respect to any counterclaim).
162. Western Nat'l Bank v. Hix, 533 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976).
163. See, e.g., Shetlin & Dickson, An Assault on the Venue Sanctuary of National
Banks, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 765 (1966).
164. 426 U.S. 148 (1976). See also Camp v. Guercio, 464 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Pa. 1979),
wherein the specific language of § 94 was held to control over the general venue directives of
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a conflict between the venue provisions of section 94 and those of
section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."6 In reaching
his conclusion, Justice Stewart relied upon a basic principle of
statutory construction that, "[w]here there is no clear intention
otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a
general one, regardless of the priority of enactment."1 66
Radzanower was a federal court action, and its holding is un-
likely to be revised soon. If the Citizens & Southern rationale is
expanded to include "established," however, a national banking as-
sociation which does not have a branch in the district where a se-
curities action is pending still would be able to invoke the venue
privilege.
Interestingly, the petitioner in Radzanower attempted to argue
waiver in its brief before the Court, but that issue was not raised in
the petition for certiorari, and so was not canvassed by the Su-
preme Court. 67
V. CONCLUSION
Ironically, a seemingly simplistic statute designed to prevent in-
convenience to a class of litigants which needed its protections in
1864, does nothing but create confusion today. One thing is cer-
tain: the statute was not designed to meet today's sophisticated
banking transaction needs. The legislative branch has chosen to do
nothing to remedy the situation, and as this review of case law has
demonstrated, the judiciary has traditionally passed the issue back
to the legislature or provided a patchwork of inadequate and in-
consistent solutions.
One hundred and twenty-six years after its enactment, there is
still no end in sight to litigation surrounding section 94. No court
of law is able to explain or justify the distinction between "estab-
lished," in the case of federal court actions, and "located" for is-
sues litigated against national banks in state court proceedings.
Only two years ago, the Supreme Court of the United States spe-
cifically held that the words were not synonymous, while declining
to explain why.1 68 Thus, seemingly for no reason whatsoever, a
plaintiff is confronted with two criteria.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (1976).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78(oo) (1976).
166. 426 U.S. at 153.
167. Id. at 151 n.3.
168. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35, 44 (1977). The Court stated:
"Whatever the reason behind the distinction in words, it does exist, and we recognize it."
EXCLUSIVE VENUE PRIVILEGE
The law appears to be that a national bank may be sued in a
state court action wherever it maintains a branch. This is assuming
that the cause of action is directed against the activities of the
branch and not the holding company or parent, all of which de-
pend partly on the myriad of state branch banking laws which are
applicable to national banking associations. If a branch bank and
the parent or holding company (which need not be situated where
the bank is located by the terms of its charter) are sued in the
same action, where is venue proper? With the advent of both
branch banking and complex and controlling state branch banking
enactments, such litigation must be anticipated. A comparably
complex procedural issue has not often confronted the judiciary;
not one court has discussed such an issue, unless the suggestion of
legislative relief is regarded as discussion. The statute in its pre-
sent form is not equipped to provide an answer. Litigants can only
hope that the judicial response will not perpetuate the wasteful
practice of requiring separate suits.
In federal court, national banks must be sued, under the man-
date of Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, where they main-
tain their principal place of business and are "established"; con-
versely, they are not subject to suit where they have only
established a branch.
The waiver doctrine is much discussed in the cases, but it pro-
vides very little reliable guidance. Most of the recent decisions
dealing with waiver involve branch banks. Since branch banking
activity does not cross state lines while individual banking transac-
tions do, the judiciary's hesitancy to expand the notion of waiver is
indeed regrettable.
Procedural devices provide some relief. Third party matters and
counterclaims definitely afford the means of avoiding the privilege
whether it be cloaked as waiver or estoppel. Yet these devices are
out of the plaintiff's control at the time suit is filed, and the astute
banking attorney would not file a counterclaim until the dismissal
route afforded by section 94 had been exhausted.
Branch banking is expanding, and the very definition of
"branch" is undergoing change and expansion by virtue of CBCT's.
No one can envision what future technology will bring. In addition,
major banking institutions are now conducting business of all sorts
on a nationwide basis. The diversified sophistication of banking
services is phenomenal. State legislatures, with some success, are
dealing with the banking responsibilities delegated to them.
It is imperative that the judiciary provide some principled solu-
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tions to these venue puzzles. New interpretations will spur Con-
gress to react to the change or to acquiese through silence. In ei-
ther case, litigants will be spared the senseless, expensive struggle
with outworn precedents.
